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Authority: E.O. 11652

By: [ ] NARA Date: 7-5-87

## MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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## PARTICIPANTS:

Huang Hua, People's Republic of China Representative to the UN  
Chung Yen, PRC Deputy Representative to the UN  
Mr. Kuo, notetaker  
Mrs. Shih Yen Hua, Interpreter  
Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador David Bruce, Designated Chief of US Liaison Office in Peking  
Winston Lord, NSC Staff  
Kathleen Ryan, NSC Staff

## DATE AND TIME:

Monday, April 16, 1973  
5:40 - 7:55 p.m.

## PLACE:

UN Mission of the People's Republic of China  
New York, N. Y.

Dr. Kissinger: How is your back, Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador Huang: Since I have come back last week, I haven't felt quite well and have received ultrasonic treatment.

Dr. Kissinger: I know a good back doctor, who unfortunately has been indicted for income tax evasion. But he is a genius on backs. He was in China with the President--Dr. Riland.

First, I would like to introduce you to Ambassador Bruce and repeat my message to the Prime Minister. Ambassador Bruce we think is our most distinguished diplomat. Before he goes to China he will have read the record of all the conversations that have been written in China, except the ones of the Marshal, which makes him unique among the diplomats.

We will also set up a communication for Ambassador Bruce which will go directly to the White House so the Ambassador and the Prime Minister can talk with the same candor as if they talked to me.

And we would separate communications so that the matters that used to be

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Authority: EO 12958

By: R. J. NARA Date: 7-5-87

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3

Amb. Huang: We haven't received any information on this.

Dr. Kissinger: We have received information that Mr. Jenkins is active in regard to getting American people invited, but we want you to know that his enthusiasm is not shared in Washington.

Amb. Huang: To correspondents this is the best opportunity to raise the request.

Dr. Kissinger: We have been told that your people raised some difficulties about it, and this has showed rather good judgement.

Amb. Huang: We will report all this to Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: Good. |

Amb. Huang: On the question of the Liaison Office I would like to inform you of something. (reading from a document) The first question is that when the Chinese Liaison Office is formally established, we will hoist our national flag and put out our emblem.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you asking or informing?

Amb. Huang: I just inform.

The second point is that the Chinese Liaison Office will not join the diplomatic corps in Washington and is not prepared to enter the book. The Chinese Liaison Office also will not participate in any functions in which the government of Taiwan takes part. It goes without saying that the Liaison Office will have contacts and exchanges with those countries that have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic.

The third point, according to Mr. Jenkins, with the approval of Dr. Kissinger, our personnel will have the same travel restrictions as the USSR, but the US side is prepared to grant our personnel the defacto complete private travel.

If Dr. Kissinger can confirm this, it will facilitate the work of the Chinese Liaison Office. However, the Chinese side states that the Liaison Office has no intention to change, and is willing to respect the uniform regulations of the US federal and state governments in regard to all foreign diplomats.

The final question--the problem of contact--the advance party, led by Han Hsu, will arrive in Washington on April 17. The Chinese side wishes to have Dr. Kissinger's guidance as to what they should pay attention to

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Authority: EO 11652

By R.T. NARA Date 7-5-87

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4

and how to get in touch with the White House.

Dr. Kissinger: I have someone going to San Francisco to meet them. I will greet them personally on Wednesday, the first day of their arrival there. We will discuss with Ambassador Han Hsu and Ambassador Bruce how to conduct their business in Washington. Mr. Solomon, in my office, has been assigned full time to dealing with your advance party. The technical arrangements should be handled through the Protocol Office. Anything substantive should be handled at the first instance in the White House.

I will invite Ambassador Han Hsu and his deputy to a lunch at the White House with Ambassador Bruce and myself. Maybe his Harvard interpreter, whose name I can't remember, and one of my people will be present too. On Friday night Ambassador Bruce will invite the whole Chinese delegation to his house for dinner.

We will be in daily touch with them. If any members of your delegation wish to come to Washington while the advance team is there we can easily arrange that or if any of them wants to come here. [New York]

Allowing for the difference of 2,000 years of history, we will try to treat them as well as we were treated in Peking.

Amb. Huang: We have a few persons who will go to Washington, but the time has not been fixed yet. When the time for the departure is fixed we will contact the US Mission here.

Dr. Kissinger: Contact us directly. It's a little more simple that way. Contact Mr. Lord.

Now with respect to your other question, I see no difficulty in raising your national flag and emblem. In respect to not being in the diplomatic book, it is entirely up to you. It does seem consistent with your status. There are few diplomatic functions for all the diplomats. Thus the situation that your mission and that of the Taiwan government will come together will not happen in anything that the government controls.

In respect to your diplomatic contacts we will place no obstacles in your way.

With respect to travel by your mission, we don't have a blanket rule for all foreign diplomats. We discriminate against Communists at the moment. So we will not promulgate a special rule for the People's Republic, but we will not enforce the rule that already exists. You should consider that an official notification.

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5

I am assuming they won't make their first trip to the nuclear test center in Nevada. (laughter)

Amb. Huang: I appreciate Dr. Kissinger's confirmation on this question. This will facilitate the work of the Liaison Office.

Dr. Kissinger: I have much to talk about. I guess I will start with the unpleasant thing first... Indochina. And let me separate the question of Cambodia and the question of the [Vietnam] settlement.

In respect to Indochina in general, we stand by what I have told the Prime Minister in February. We have no interests in re-entering into Indochina. We have every interest in disengaging from Indochina. But we cannot permit that an agreement that we have signed, after losing 50,000 men, is immediately broken in every article within weeks of its signature. As I have often discussed with the Prime Minister, if the agreement had been observed for a reasonable period of time and there had been a difference between the Vietnamese... But here we have a situation where American troops have just left and the North Vietnamese have not kept any part [of the agreement] for even a day, except for the release of American prisoners.

The North Vietnamese have introduced 400 tanks and 200 artillery pieces since January 28. And they have the insolence to tell us that this is civilian goods. I have here a partial list of the equipment that they have introduced. It will be the first time in history that TV sets have been introduced in tanks. I have also brought a list of all the exchanges that have taken place with the North Vietnamese so that you can study them in Peking. It includes every message that has passed on the issue of violations. (Pointing to the two sides of the folder) These are the US and the others are the North Vietnamese. (He hands over the messages at Tab A)

We are not asking you to judge these conflicting claims. We do want to point out that the capacity of lying of your Allies is equal to their heroism.

But we will leave that aside for the moment. We have to stress that it is impossible for the United States to tolerate flagrant violations of the Agreement. If they continue, it will be a very serious situation. We will under no circumstances tolerate it much longer. We have no interest in re-entering in Indochina. We want nothing more than to end our involvement. But a reasonable time period has to elapse after our exit. (between the present situation and an evolution)

We will use our maximum influence with our friends so that they observe

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Authority: EO 11652

By: J. NARA Date: 7/5/07

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

6

the Agreement. We do not encourage them to violate the Agreement, and will use every influence we have so that they observe the Agreement. We will use and we will scrupulously observe our part of the Agreement.

We believe very strongly that it would be useful if the friends of the other side would also use their influence and not give them the means to start another offensive. We guarantee we will not help our friends to start another offensive.

With respect to Cambodia, we are prepared to work with you to bring about some coalition structure along the lines that the Prime Minister and I discussed in Peking. We are not committed to any particular personality. And we would encourage negotiations between representatives of Prince Sihanouk and the other forces.

Our objective in Southeast Asia seems to us not totally dissimilar from yours. We want to prevent a security system extending in South and Southeast Asia controlled by one unit and one outside power. We believe this is best achieved if each country in the region can develop its own national identity.

We have reduced our military aid to South Vietnam to the level of replacement. We are not adding to their forces.

With respect to Cambodia, we have no interest in any American dominant or major position in Cambodia. We would immediately honor any ceasefire that is achieved in Cambodia.

So we hope that the situation in Indochina can be pacified. The longer there is a period of quiet, the more certain and permanent the withdrawal will be.

These are the major things I wanted to say on Indochina.

Amb. Huang: You have quite a lot of things to talk about. You have just finished one page. (laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: Some of this is the documents that you already have. I predicted to Ambassador Bruce before we came here that you would listen to everything I had to say and that you would do it at the last moment.

Now let me talk to you about Soviet relations. You know that from the visit of Mr. Lord that we are discussing a meeting with Mr. Brezhnev in the United States.

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Authority: EO 11652

By: R. J. NARA Date: 7-5-87

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7

Now no precise date has been fixed because your Allies are trying to blackmail us with respect to the nuclear treaty we have been discussing. But my estimate is that it will take place around June 18, give or take a few days. Also, I will probably go to Moscow within the period from May 5 to May 8 in order to prepare for his visit.

Now let me tell you first, what the issues are that we will be discussing and let me repeat again our general strategy.

First, the USSR is pressing very hard with respect to the nuclear treaty, of which we gave you a copy. Now I want you to know what we have said to them with respect to Article 1. You have this treaty in mind? Should I leave it with you again?

Amb. Huang: We have it.

Dr. Kissinger: In respect to Article 1 we will not make any undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against each other. In respect to Article 2, we will not make an obligation involving third countries relations to other third countries. (reads article) "In the event of a military conflict involving states not parties to this Treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States will make every effort to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by the participants in the conflict." We will not accept that either. And we will not accept the phrase that "the Soviet Union and the United States will make efforts to prevent their becoming involved in a collision with the use of nuclear weapons as a result of action by third countries." We have told them that we would consider a statement in agreement form of the principles that we have already agreed to last year. We did not say that we would accept it, but that we will consider it. Something to the effect that the objective should be that nuclear weapons should not be used by the two countries against each other or against third countries. The second thing is that this objective can be reached only if the two countries renounce the use or the threat of force against each other or against third countries.

In other words, we will not consider any binding obligation, but only a general statement of objectives. We will not accept any statement of objectives that is not equally applicable to third countries.

Now they have told us they will make a proposal. When we get it we will let you see it, and we will give you an opportunity to express your views.

Our fixed principle is that we will not sign anything with them that omits third countries, that states an absolute obligation, or that can be used to discriminate, that frees their hands, towards third countries. We will

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8

give you, as I said, an opportunity to state your views before we proceed.

The draft we gave you we have rejected, and that is no longer subject for discussion.

Amb. Huang: I would like to ask something on this question. It is only again something on which I personally want your clarification.

In the conversation of March 17 the US side said that the US side would not make the binding obligation not to use nuclear weapons. While on the other hand it was said that the question under discussion was principles. Dr. Kissinger, you said that you would consider a statement of principles. This seems to be a contradiction. How should that be understood? What does the formulation of principles or statement of principles mean?

Dr. Kissinger: You remember from the US-Soviet declaration in the Moscow talks that was something like this--the objective should be to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. We will not go beyond what is contained in the existing principle, but even a statement of this nature would be qualified by saying that before that condition could be reached there has to be something about the use or threat of force. This has to apply to all nations, not just to the USSR and the US.

We don't want to make a specific proposal ourselves.

Amb. Huang: Does that mean an agreement between the US and the USSR?

Dr. Kissinger: To do what?

Amb. Huang: In reference to the statement of principles.

Dr. Kissinger: First of all, there is no agreement. What we reject is any obligation and secondly we will reject a principle that is identical to an obligation.

The only principle that we can consider is one that says if the countries renounce the threat of force against each other, each other's allies or against third countries, and don't in fact use force, then nuclear war can be eliminated.

Amb. Huang: The Chinese side has stated very clearly its position on the question of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. And I assume Dr. Kissinger is aware of it. We also conveyed the Chinese position last year.

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Authority EO 12958By RT NARA Date 7-5-97TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

9

Dr. Kissinger: This is in response to obligations we would undertake. There are two things we will not do. We will not undertake an obligation and won't state principles that exclude third countries. And we will not proceed without showing you the documents that exist for your comments.

Amb. Huang: But I also hope that the US will take note of the Chinese position previously stated. When you have the documents you will convey these.

Dr. Kissinger: We will give you the document as soon as we have it. We will call Mrs. Shih and will tell her we have it. We will convey it by messenger as we don't want others to see it. That will be the Soviet proposal, not an agreed document.

Amb. Huang: I wonder whether the US and the USSR will reach an agreement in June when Brezhnev is here in Washington.

Dr. Kissinger: Not without prior discussion with you.

Amb. Huang: I am sorry I have interrupted you.

Dr. Kissinger: It is very important that we understand each other. Our strategy... we have no illusions about Soviet intentions.

We will never participate in any maneuvers to isolate the People's Republic. We will never make any agreement that will be used to bring pressure on the People's Republic. Our strategy, as I explained, is to gain the maximum amount of time for us to solidify our relations. Secondly, it forces the Soviet Union, if it has aggressive intentions, to do so from a clear posture of aggression. Thirdly, it puts ourselves into the maximum position to resist hegemonial desires, as the President expressed in his messages to the Prime Minister and the Chairman.

Anything we would consider would have as its objective to place the Soviet Union in a position that if it does use force, it has broken some principle of international relations. And we will not permit nuclear weapons to be put in a separate category.

But the matter might also take the course it did last fall. We raised so many objections that there was nothing to be achieved.

The other matter for discussion is strategic arms limitations. The USSR has made a very comprehensive proposal in Geneva, which in effect wants to make the existing agreement permanent. It calls for the withdrawal of

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Authority EC 15-170

By RT NARA Date 7-5-87

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

10

forward based systems. They want a ban in effect on every weapon we are now developing. They have also proposed some limitations on MIRV'S. We will not accept that either. This is their opening position.

We will make a counter proposal with the next ten days, and when completed we will give you a copy. This will not be done in Geneva, but we will give it to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington so that you cannot assume a general knowledge exists.

I would be glad to explain the Soviet proposal, but it is so one-sided. It is like your border negotiations. Since we are not going to accept it, it would simply overwork Assistant Minister Chang having to analyze it. But if you are interested, we can telegraph to you the essential elements. If you would like to have it in Peking.

Amb. Huang: That is up to you to decide.

Dr. Kissinger: We will send you a summary tomorrow. We will have it before the end of the day. But you should assume that we will reject it. There are elements in there that we may consider. As soon as we have our counter proposal ready, we will give it to you.

We will certainly not accept the proposal that we should withdraw our foreign based aircraft.

Not the European Security Conference...the progress is slow because of the vanity of the European Foreign Ministers. Each feels obliged to introduce his own scheme. Our strategy is to have the conference as meaningless as possible.

The Soviets have proposed that the Foreign Ministers meet on June 28 for two weeks, and then leave their representatives for another six weeks and have a heads of government meeting in October. At this moment they haven't even agreed on an agenda. The topic that occupies the best minds of the conference is how to express the nine different proposals that exist. ( Aside to Amb. Bruce, "It is the goddamdest thing.")

Amb. Huang: That is ten?

Dr. Kissinger: Nine. We are taking a neutral position. We are letting everybody propose every idea he has, but our basic intention is to reduce the meeting to a series of platitudes.

Amb. Huang: The efficiency is not as good as the UN. The UN can produce many resolutions.

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11

Dr. Kissinger: They don't have the Chinese participating at the other.  
[Security Conference]

On the mutual force reductions, it is now in its procedural phase. Our strategy is different from the European Security Conference. We want a proposal that is as concrete as possible, in order to keep reductions to levels that are not dangerous to the security of Europe, and also to prevent an irresponsible Congress here pressing for larger reductions of our forces. We are developing two proposals which we will discuss with our Allies and will not make to the Soviet Union before October--November.

But as I told the Prime Minister when in Peking in February, we are not envisaging a reduction that is larger than 10%. And we expect to negotiate about that for a considerable period of time. We are not interested in freeing Soviet forces.

We will send you a summary of this proposal when it is finished for your information.

Other items that are being discussed are a continuation of projects of last summer in science, oceanography, agriculture and so forth and of no major importance.

This is all I have on Soviet relations.

Korea. Let me explain what we meant to convey on March 17 in respect to UNCURK. UNCURK cannot abolish itself since it was established by the UN. Our idea is the following: that the first step is that UNCURK adjourn 'sine die', after adjourning, the General Assembly can then abolish it. But we would like that in return there be no general debate on the Korean question. But we will cooperate in the abolishing of UNCURK by these two steps which I indicated to you.

With respect to the military exercise, we were all very proud of ourselves. We thought we had caught you in an inaccuracy. But I regret to say that your information was better than mine. We were under the impression that these operations had taken place every year when we approved it. And we reduced in fact the size of it from its original proposal. You were right that it had not taken place.

Amb. Huang: For four years.

Dr. Kissinger: Since 1970. We had approved it on the basis of a wrong assumption. I will keep your comments in mind in the future.

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By PT NARA Date 25-07TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

12

I have committed so many security violations to our Chinese friends, that I might as well show you what has been prepared for me. Just don't publish it in the People's Daily. (He hands over the document at Tab B)

Winston Lord: It has the correct information on previous exercises.

Dr. Kissinger: You will notice that it says that "the Chinese were right". This is now in the past, but we know your comments were right.

Some other items to keep you informed.

Amb. Huang: I only want to say this, that our message of April 4 is based on facts and I will convey what you have said.

Dr. Kissinger: We agree. Our decision was not based on facts, but that is our problem.

Amb. Huang: On the question of UNCURK, we have mentioned our position towards UNCURK in our last message.

Dr. Kissinger: This is our reply, an explanation of the procedures we want to follow, which we think is consistent with what I discussed with the Prime Minister. I have proposed the two steps to achieve what was discussed.

Amb. Huang: I remember that before the General Assembly last year we talked about this question. At that time Dr. Kissinger hoped that this question would be postponed until next year. And you also hoped that before the next session of the General Assembly UNCURK would be automatically dissolved.

Dr. Kissinger: It is also fair to say that you did not agree to the postponement last year. The difficulty is that UNCURK cannot dissolve itself. It has to be dissolved by the General Assembly. That is the only way it can happen practically. But in return we want no discussion of other Korean items. This is the same position we had last year.

Amb. Huang: I just want to say that as we mentioned in your message of April 4 you have mentioned this to Premier Chou En-lai when you were in Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right, that we would cooperate in abolishing UNCURK. We cannot abolish UNCURK, and it cannot abolish itself. But we can cooperate in adjourning it and then abolishing it.

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Authority

EO 1.170

By RT NARA Date 7-5-87

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

13

Amb. Huang: You didn't mention the condition that it shall be postponed again, that the Korean question should be postponed.

Dr. Kissinger: Well if UNCURK doesn't exist what question remains to be discussed?

Amb. Huang: We made it very clear last year that it would do no good to postpone the Korean question year after year. We don't think that it is a sensible policy for the US side to postpone discussion of the question of Korea in the General Assembly at the UN. They are only my personal opinions, and I have no more to say.

Dr. Kissinger: On Siberian development that you raised last time [March 17, 1973 meeting]. We have authorized American firms to proceed to investigate the possibilities, but we have not given them any financial guarantees as yet. Then we will give priority to those who work jointly with the Japanese, as discussed in Peking. But we are proceeding rather slowly.

The agreements which you read about in the newspaper--Mr. Hammer--do not have government backing; they are done by private companies without government support.

With respect to some discussions I had with the Prime Minister, and the Chairman, we are proceeding to strengthen the group of countries from Turkey to Pakistan. Prime Minister Bhutto has been invited for July 17, and the Shah is coming on July 24. We are exploring the possibilities of assistance to Pakistan. The final decisions in regard to Iran and Pakistan we prefer to take when Bhutto and the Shah meet with the President.

We are also expecting a visit by Tanaka later this summer.

The only other item I have is to tell you that we are in the process of setting up another meeting with Ismail. We are expecting Brandt and Andreotti, and we will proceed along the lines of our discussions.

Also the President has asked me to say to you that if the Prime Minister should be visiting the UN this fall, we would be very happy to receive him in Washington. This might be an opportunity for a symbolic reunion. We don't insist that he go to the UN because there may be very many "empty cannons" fired. But if this should be the most convenient way of doing it...

Amb. Huang: We haven't received any information in this field.

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14

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe you could convey this to the Prime Minister and perhaps it would put an idea into his head.

Amb. Huang: Certainly, I will convey it.

Dr. Kissinger: The only other problem, could you take Eugene Ormandy of the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra off my back? You will have my undying gratitude. He thinks it is the pre-eminent problem of the Chinese government to get him there.

Amb. Huang: Very soon Ambassador Huang will arrive in the US and Ambassador Bruce will arrive in Peking, and you will be relieved of Ormandy.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know if Ormandy's emotional equilibrium is up to waiting that long. This is not an American governmental problem.

Amb. Huang: If Dr. Kissinger has no more information, I would like to make some comments on the question of Cambodia and Vietnam. (Reading from document) First, on Vietnam, I am telling you in a personal capacity. Premier Chou En-lai stated clearly the Chinese position during his talks with Dr. Kissinger last February. We hope that the Paris Agreement will be observed by all parties. The Chinese side, on its part, undertook the obligation to respect the relevant part of the Agreement in accordance with the Final Act of the International Conference.

We know that the Vietnamese side has strived to carry out the Agreement strictly. It is no more a secret that prior to the signing of the Agreement, there was a postponement by the US side and it rushed to the South by all means shipments of large quantities of armaments planned for the whole year of 1973. And even when the US troops had withdrawn from South Vietnam, they left behind a considerable amount of equipment and bases to the Saigon authorities. Recently the US side has also indicated to Nguyen Van Thieu that it will continue to give all its assistance to him.

Since Dr. Kissinger has mentioned this question, I think it necessary to set forth my own views.

On the question of Cambodia, the Chinese position is consistent and has been made public. And I assume Dr. Kissinger must be well aware of it. Last February Premier Chou En-lai again advised the US side not to intervene in Cambodian internal affairs any longer so that the Cambodian people could resolve the problem by themselves. As publicly pointed out by Prince Sihanouk after touring the liberated areas, the Cambodian Peoples' Liberation Forces are fighting absolutely alone without the aid of the North Vietnamese troops or of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Forces.

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Authority: EO 11652

By: NARA B&B 2507

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15

Prince Sihanouk has repeatedly indicated and still indicates, his readiness to negotiate with the US side. However the US side has not only refused to negotiate, but has intensified the bombing of Cambodia, which is most unpopular.

Under such circumstances it is only natural and irreproachable for the Chinese side to state its principled stand in public. We cannot but feel extremely surprised at your extreme disappointment.

It is impossible to find a way out of the Cambodian question by sustaining the Lon Nol traitorous clique. No amount of further US support to Lon Nol will be of any avail. On the contrary, it will only hamper the solutions of the Cambodian question, and at the same time will affect adversely Sino-US relations.

Another question is that in the President's March 16 letter to Chairman Mao--it mentioned that the integrity of China is a fundamental element in American foreign policy, and the US side believes that the viability and independence of China is in the interest of world peace. What is the implication?

The above are comments of mine made in a personal capacity. The last I want Dr. Kissinger to clarify.

Dr. Kissinger: The Cambodian comment was your personal comment, Mr. Ambassador?

Amb. Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: The implication of this remark to Chairman Mao is for its own purpose and without any reciprocity on the part of the People's Republic, the US side would consider any threat to the integrity of the People's Republic as incompatible with its own interests and with the interests of world peace. This is as an American decision and without request for reciprocity.

Amb. Huang: I have nothing more to comment.

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to Cambodia, since we are arguing between each other, I would have thought that it was in the interest of both of our countries not to put each other publicly in the position of embarrassment. Secondly, many things are possible as a result of evolution that are very difficult to accept as a result of military pressure. And we believe that a constructive solution of the Cambodian problem is possible if it is not the result of military pressures, including discussions with representatives

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Authority EO 11652By RT NARA Date 2507TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

17

Amb. Bruce: I am very grateful.

Amb. Huang: Literally, to "wash off the Dust."

Amb. Bruce: The Peking dust?

Amb. Huang: The dust accumulated from your trip.

Amb. Bruce: Thank you.

(As cordial farewells were being exchanged Dr. Kissinger remarked that he hoped that Ambassador Bruce wouldn't do so good a job that he need not return to China. Ambassador Huang recalled that Dr. Kissinger had said that he would probably return to the PRC the latter part of this year. Dr. Kissinger acknowledged this, saying that after the Brezhnev visit to the US, there could be a decision whether an early visit to China by him would be useful.)